STRATFOR

Many Hurdles Will Delay U.S. Attack on Iraq

Summary

Although the Bush administration appears committed to attacking
Iraq, its ability to do so is limited by several logistical
problems, such as the availability of precision weaponry and
aircraft carriers. These issues are temporary, but a great number
of political problems that could block a campaign will prove much
more difficult to solve.

Analysis

U.S. President George W. Bush vowed July 8 to use "all tools" at
his disposal to oust Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Speaking at
a surprise news conference, Bush said the world would be a safer
place once Saddam was overthrown and that he personally is
engaged in "all aspects" of planning to achieve that goal.

The speech was not the first time Bush had made it clear that his
administration is committed to regime change in Iraq. Of the many
options available to the White House, only large-scale military
action will guarantee the United States an active hand in Iraq
once Saddam is gone. However, technical limitations will push
back the date of an attack until winter at the absolute earliest,
and a host of political hurdles could delay a campaign
indefinitely.

U.S. strategic planners see two specific reasons to depose
Saddam. First, Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons
programs threaten the balance of power in the Middle East.
Officials in Washington also fear that those weapons someday
could find their way into the hands of al Qaeda. This argument is
based on logic and potentiality rather than evidence, but the
consequences of such a development would be so terrible that the
argument must be given credence.

The second reason involves oil. Iraq has huge reserves of crude,
and gaining control over those resources would greatly enhance
U.S. energy security -- and give Washington considerable leverage
over other oil producers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The
governments of both countries absolutely depend on oil revenues
to maintain domestic stability, and both use their reserves as
leverage when negotiating with the United States and the rest of
the world. For example, Saudi Arabia's oil reserves are a big
reason that U.S. military forces are chasing al Qaeda in western
Pakistan and not in western Saudi Arabia.

U.S. influence over Iraqi oil reserves would dramatically
decrease Riyadh's leverage with Washington. And, in a pinch, the
United States could threaten to increase Iraqi outputs and
bankrupt the Saudi and Iranian economies.

But how to get rid of the current regime in Baghdad? The most
hands-off option would be some sort of covert action to remove
Saddam -- possibly by assassinating him, capturing him or forcing
him to flee the country. However, this also is the most difficult
option and the one least likely to succeed. There also is no
guarantee that whatever group that replaced Saddam would be any
better or easier for Washington to control.

Sparking an internal coup is equally unlikely. For one thing, it
is an extremely difficult thing to do: Stratfor counts at least
four unsuccessful coup plots since the end of the Gulf War. Iraq
is a police state in many respects, and Saddam has an extensive
internal security apparatus at his disposal, comprising multiple
agencies that watch each other as well as monitor potential
unrest. He also manipulates the tribal rivalries that permeate
Iraq, playing factions against each other until it is unclear who
is on which side.

Coups and covert action carry with them the same problem: The
United States would have relatively little control over the
successor government. In this particular case, any Iraqi military
officer with the fortitude to take on Saddam would not likely
jump eagerly into a role as a U.S. proxy. A new military regime
may even find it useful to continue Iraq's chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons programs.

The only way to ensure the collapse of the current regime and the
establishment of a suitable replacement is to put U.S. boots on
the ground in Iraq. The question is, how many boots?

The "Afghan model" of warfare certainly offers an appealing
answer. Using Special Operations forces to link up with local
militants under U.S. air cover would require relatively few U.S.
troops, without a months-long buildup.

But this option has several problems. First, the Iraqi opposition
is not in the same military class as was the Northern Alliance,
which had 20,000 hardened fighters under its command. Iraq's
Kurdish and Shiite groups maintain armed militias -- but fewer,
and with less experience.

Second, the Iraqi army is more formidable than were the Taliban,
at least in conventional conflict. Iraq can field more than
200,000 troops as well as tanks, artillery, helicopters and anti-
aircraft systems -- far more effective than the 50,000 lightly
armed troops commanded by the Taliban. And the Taliban's numbers
were over-inflated due to alliances of convenience, which quickly
fell apart, with local warlords.

The physical size of Iraq and the amount of potential opposition
likely will mean a substantial troop commitment for the United
States, if for no other reason than to cover all contingencies.
An assessment earlier this year by a former National Security
Council member estimated a that a total force of 200,000 to
300,000 troops would be necessary -- a number that was confirmed
by later leaks from the Pentagon. Troops likely would be
stationed in Kuwait and Turkey, with a limited number in Jordan.

This plan, which has been dubbed "Desert Storm Lite," likely
would rely more on air-mobile operations than the United States
did during the Gulf War. Such operations would be necessary to
secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction sites and would be
backed up by armored thrusts from the north and south.

Although the precise details of Desert Storm Lite are unclear,
the ultimate result is: a substantial U.S. military presence in
Iraq and a strong U.S. hand in rebuilding the government.

The Bush administration's problem is that any campaign against
Iraq depends upon a host of other factors. These technical and
political problems likely will set back any potential attack
until nearly 2004.

On the technical side, the U.S. military has not recovered fully
from the initial battle in Afghanistan. Military forces,
especially aircraft carriers, were thrown into battle on the fly
last fall, much to the detriment of training and maintenance
schedules. Three of the 12 U.S. aircraft carriers are currently
at sea, three are in training cycles, and the rest are undergoing
repairs in port. Training and repairs for several more carriers
are scheduled for completion by late autumn, giving the Pentagon
at least five carriers for an attack.

Also, the U.S. military still may be short of critical weapons.
Defense officials told the Wall Street Journal in May that it
would take approximately six months to bring the stock of
Hellfire anti-tank missiles up to levels necessary to attack
Iraq. The same is true for the Joint Direct Attack Munition
(JDAM) bombs -- which use a global positioning system guidance
mechanism -- that proved so useful in Afghanistan.

Even if the Pentagon's arsenal was bulging, U.S. troops and
supplies still would have to be moved into place, and most
estimates say the buildup would take at least two months. There
was some evidence earlier this year that the United States has
been "cheating" -- quietly moving men and materiel into the
theater -- but even at the most optimistic, Washington apparently
would need at least one month for buildup.

Even more difficult than logistics are the numerous political
issues to be solved. For instance, the war in Afghanistan must be
kept at no more than a low simmer in order for a campaign against
Iraq to proceed. Washington also must ensure that tensions
between nuclear-armed Pakistan and India do not re-ignite after
elections in Kashmir this October and that the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict does not spill over into the rest of the
Middle East, as it threatened to do this year.

The White House also must feel comfortable that Syria and Iran
will not intervene on Baghdad's behalf. Neither is any great
friend of Iraq, but both Damascus and Tehran are extremely
nervous about the prospect of a U.S. proxy state, with its hand
on the oil taps, emerging on their borders.

Likewise, the Bush administration must counter Saudi Arabia's
diplomatic efforts to block an attack on Baghdad. Riyadh is
concerned both about its status in the oil market and the
fundamentalist backlash that a U.S. attack could trigger at home.
That's why the Saudi government has spent the last six months
trying to force Washington to focus on the conflict in Israel.

If that weren't enough, the government in Turkey -- one of
Washington's key allies -- is now caught in a domestic political
maelstrom: The coalition government is slowly collapsing, and new
elections may be in the works.

Meanwhile, much of the rest of the industrialized world --
including the European Union, Russia and China -- are none too
keen on Washington's plans. It is doubtful that they will
actively oppose the United States with anything more than
rhetoric, but Washington would no doubt like to have their
silence, if not their support.

Last but by no means least, the United States must have a
successor regime ready to take over in Baghdad. Assembling such a
regime is no easy task, given the squabbling factions that make
up the Iraqi opposition. They mirror the Iraqi population itself,
which is split between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds -- all of which
are further subdivided into competing clans and tribes.